Closeness is described as a privacy measure and its advantages are illustrated through examples and experiments on a real dataset. In this Paper the closeness can be verified by giving different values for N and T. Government agencies and other organizations often need to publish micro data, e.g., medical data or census data, for research and other purposes. Typically, such data are stored in a table, and each record (row) corresponds to one individual. Generally if we want to publish micro data A common anonymization approach is generalization, which replaces quasi-identifier values with values that are less-specific but semantically consistent. As a result, more records will have the same set of quasi-identifier values. An equivalence class of an anonymized table is defined to be a set of records that have the same values for the quasi-identifiers To effectively limit disclosure, the disclosure risk of an anonymized table is to be measured. To this end, k-anonymity is introduced as the property that each record is indistinguishable with at least k-1 other records with respect to the quasi-identifier i.e., k-anonymity requires that each equivalence class contains at least k records. While kanonymity protects against identity disclosure, it is insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure. To address the above limitation of k-anonymity, a new notion of privacy, called l-diversity is introduced, which requires that the distribution of a sensitive attribute in each equivalence class has at least l "well represented" values. One problem with ldiversity is that it is limited in its assumption of adversarial knowledge. This assumption generalizes the specific background and homogeneity attacks used to motivate ldiversity. The k-anonymity privacy requirement for publishing micro data requires that each equivalence class contains at least k records. But k-anonymity cannot prevent attribute disclosure. The notion of l-diversity has been proposed to address this; l-diversity requires that each equivalence class has at least l well-represented values for each sensitive attribute. L-diversity has a number of limitations. In particular, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent attribute disclosure. Due to these limitations, a new notion of privacy called "closeness" is proposed. First the base model t-closeness is presented, which requires that the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class is close to the distribution of the attribute in the overall table. Then a more flexible privacy model called (n, t)-closeness is proposed. The rationale for using
INTRODUCTION
Government agencies and other organizations often need to publish micro data, e.g., medical data or census data, for research and other purposes. Typically, such data are stored in a table, and each record (row) corresponds to one individual. Each record has a number of attributes, which can be divided into the following three categories: 1) Attributes that clearly identify individuals. These are known as explicit identifiers and include, e.g., Social Security Number. 2) Attributes whose values when taken together can potentially identify an individual. These are known as quasiidentifiers, and may include, e.g., Zip code, Birth-date and Gender.
3) Attributes that are considered sensitive, such as Disease and Salary. While the released table gives useful information to researchers, it presents disclosure risk to the individuals whose data are in the table. Therefore, the objective is to limit the disclosure risk to an acceptable level while maximizing the benefit. This is achieved by anonymizing the data before release. The first step of anonymization is to remove explicit identifiers. However, this is not enough, as an adversary may already know the quasi-identifier values of some individuals in the table. This knowledge can be either from personal knowledge (e.g., knowing a particular individual in person), or from other publicly available databases (e.g., a voter registration list) that include both explicit identifiers and quasi -identifiers A common anonymization approach is generalization, which replaces quasi-identifier values with values that are lessspecific but semantically consistent. As a result, more records will have the same set of quasi-identifier values. An equivalence class of an anonymized table is defined to be a set of records that have the same values for the quasi-identifiers To effectively limit disclosure, the disclosure risk of an anonymized table is to be measured. To this end, k-anonymity is introduced as the property that each record is indistinguishable with at least k-1 other records with respect to the quasi-identifier i.e., k-anonymity requires that each equivalence class contains at least k records. While kanonymity protects against identity disclosure, it is insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure. To address the above limitation of k-anonymity, a new notion of privacy, called l-diversity is introduced, which requires that the distribution of a sensitive attribute in each equivalence class has at least l "well represented" values. One problem with l-diversity is that it is limited in its assumption of adversarial knowledge. This assumption generalizes the specific background and homogeneity attacks used to motivate l-diversity. Therefore, the proposed privacy measure limits the amount of individual-specific information an observer can learn.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
The objective of this work is to limit the disclosure risk to an acceptable level while maximizing the benefit. While kanonymity protects against identity disclosure, it does not provide sufficient protection against attribute disclosure. The notion of 'l-diversity attempts to solve this problem. Ldiversity presents two attacks. Due to these limitations, a novel privacy notion called "closeness" is proposed .Two instantiations are proposed: a base model called t-closeness and a more flexible privacy model called (n, t)-closeness. Let the collection of attributes {zip code, age, nationality} be the quasi-identifier for this dataset. Figure 3 shows a 4-anonymous table derived from the table in Figure 2 (here "*" denotes a suppressed value so, for example, "zip code = 1485*" means that the zip code is in the range [14850−14859] and "age=3*"means the age is in the range [30 − 39] 
K-ANONIMITY
] = t2[QI T ], t3[QI T ] = t4[QI T ], t5[QI T ] = t6[QI T ], t7[QI T ] = t8[QI T ] = t9[QI T ], and t10[QI T ] = t11[QI T ].
Attacks on k-Anonymity
This section presents two attacks, the homogeneity attack and the background knowledge attack, and shows how they can be used to compromise a k-anonymous dataset. Observation 1: k-Anonymity can create groups that leak information due to lack of diversity in the sensitive attribute. Note that such a situation is not uncommon. As a back-ofthe-envelope calculation, suppose we have a dataset containing 60,000 distinct tuples where the sensitive attribute can take 3 distinct values and is not correlated with the no sensitive attributes. A 5-anonymization of this table will have around 12,000 groups2 and, on average, 1 out of every 81 groups will have no diversity (the values for the sensitive attribute will all be the same). Thus we should expect about 148 groups with no diversity. Therefore, information about 740 people would be compromised by a homogeneity attack.
This suggests that in addition to k-anonymity, the sanitized 
l-DIVERSITY
To address these limitations of k-anonymity, l-diversity is introduced as a stronger notion of privacy. The l-diversity principle: An equivalence class is said to have l-diversity if there are at least l "well-represented" values for the sensitive attribute. A table is said to have l-diversity if every equivalence class of the table has l-diversity.
Following are a number of interpretations of the term "well represented" in this principle: 1. Distinct l-diversity. The simplest understanding of "well represented" would be to ensure that there are at least l distinct values for the sensitive attribute in each equivalence class. Distinct l-diversity does not prevent probabilistic inference attacks. An equivalence class may have one value appear much more frequently than other values, enabling an adversary to conclude that an entity in the equivalence class is very likely to have that value. This motivated the development of the following stronger notions of l-diversity.
2.
Entropy l-diversity. The entropy of an equivalence class E is defined to be
in which S is the domain of the sensitive attribute and p(E, s) is the fraction of records in E that have sensitive value s. A table is said to have entropy l-diversity if for every equivalence class E, Entropy (E) ≥ log l. Entropy l-diversity is stronger than distinct l-diversity. As pointed out in [4] , in order to have entropy l-diversity for each equivalence class, the entropy of the entire table must be at least log (l). Sometimes, this may too restrictive, as the entropy of the entire table may be low if a few values are very common. This leads to the following less conservative notion of l-diversity. 3. Recursive (c, l)-diversity. Recursive (c, l)-diversity (c is a float number and l is an integer) makes sure that the most frequent value does not appear too frequently, and the less frequent values do not appear too rarely. Let m be the number of values in an equivalence class, and r i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m be the number of times that the i th most frequent sensitive value appears in an equivalence class E.Then, E is said to have recursive (c, l)-diversity if r1 < c (r l + r l+1 +…+r m ). A table is said to have recursive (c, l) -diversity if all of its equivalence classes have recursive (c, l)-diversity [5] .
Limitations of l -Diversity
While the l-diversity principle represents an important step beyond k-anonymity in protecting against attribute disclosure, it has several shortcomings shown below l-diversity is insufficient to prevent attribute disclosure. Two attacks on ldiversity are shown below. Skew ness Attack: When the overall distribution is skewed, satisfying l-diversity does not prevent attribute disclosure. Consider again Example 5. Suppose that one equivalence class has an equal number of positive records and negative records. It satisfies distinct 2-diversity, entropy 2-diversity, and any recursive (c, 2)-diversity requirement that can be imposed. However, this presents a serious privacy risk, because anyone in the class would be considered to have 50% possibility of being positive, as compared with the 1% of the overall population. Now consider an equivalence class that has 49 positive records and only 1 negative record. It would be distinct 2-diverse and has higher entropy than the overall table (and thus satisfies any Entropy l-diversity that one can impose), even though anyone in the equivalence class would be considered 98% positive, rather than 1% percent. In fact, this equivalence class has exactly the same diversity as a class that has 1 positive and 49 negative record, even though the two classes present very different levels of privacy risks.
(n, t)-Closeness: A NEW PRIVACY MEASURE
The (n, t)-closeness principle: An equivalence class E 1 is said to have (n, t)-closeness if there exists a set E 2 of records that is a natural superset of E 1 such that E 2 contains at least n records, and the distance between the two distributions of the sensitive attribute in E 1 and E 2 is no more than a threshold t. A table is said to have (n, t)-closeness if all equivalence classes have (n, t)-closeness. The intuition is that to learn information about a population of a large-enough size (at least n). One key term in the above definition is "natural superset". Assume that we want to achieve (1000, 0.1)-closeness for the above example. The first equivalence class E 1 is defined by (zip code="476**", 20 ≤ Age ≤ 29) and contains 600 tuples. One equivalence class that naturally contains it would be the one defined by (zip code= "476**", 20 ≤ Age ≤ 39). Another such equivalence class would be the one defined by (zip code= "47***", 20 ≤ Age ≤ 29). If both of the two large equivalence classes contain at least 1,000 records, and E 1 's distribution is close to (i.e., the distance is at most 0.1) either of the two large equivalence classes, then E 1 satisfies (1,000, 0.1)-closeness. In the above definition of the (n, t)-closeness principle, the parameter n defines the breadth of the observer's background knowledge. Smaller n means that the observer knows the sensitive information about a smaller group of records. The parameter t bounds the amount of sensitive information that the observer can get from the released table. A smaller t implies a stronger privacy requirement. In fact, Table 5 satisfies (1,000, 0.1)-closeness. The second equivalence class satisfies (1,000, 0.1)-closeness because it contains 2,000 > 1,000 individuals, and thus, meets the privacy requirement (by setting the large group to be itself).
The first and the third equivalence classes also satisfy (1,000, 0.1)-closeness because both have the same distribution (the distribution is (0.5, 0.5)) as the large group which is the union of these two equivalence classes and the large group contains 1,000 individuals. Choosing the parameters n and t would affect the level of privacy and utility. The larger n is and the smaller t is, one achieves more privacy and less utility. 
ANONYMIZATION ALGORITHM
One challenge is designing algorithms for anonymizing the data to achieve (n, t)-closeness. This section, describes how to adapt the Mondrian multidimensional algorithm for (n, t)-closeness model. Since t-closeness is a special model of (n, t)-closeness, Mondrian can also be used to achieve t-closeness.
P is partitioned into r partitions {P 1 , P 2 ,…..,P r } output: true if (n, t)-closeness is satisfied, false otherwise
for every P i if P i contains less than n records find=false for every Q ε Parent(P) and |Q| ≥ n
Figure1. The Checking Algorithm
The algorithm consists of three components: 1) Choosing a dimension on which to partition; 2) Choosing a value to split; and 3) Checking if the partitioning violates the privacy requirement. Figure 1 gives the algorithm for checking if a partitioning satisfies the (n, t)-closeness requirement. Let P be a set of tuples. Suppose that P is partitioned into r partitions {P1; P 2; . . . ; P r}, i.e., Ui {Pi}= P and Pi ∩ P j =Ø ; for any i ≠ j. Each partition Pi can be further partitioned and all partitions form a partition tree with P being the root. Let Parent (P) denote the set of partitions on the path from P to the root, which is the partition containing all tuples in the table. If Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ r) contains at least n records, then Pi satisfies the (n, t)-closeness requirement. If Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ r) contains less than n records, the algorithm computes the distance between Pi and each partition in Parent (P). If there exists at least one large partition (containing at least n records) in Parent (P) whose distance to Pi (D [Pi; Q]) is at most t, then Pi satisfies the (n, t)-closeness requirement. Otherwise, P i violates the (n, t)-closeness requirement. The partitioning satisfies the (n, t)-closeness requirement if all P i s have (n, t)-closeness
DISTANCE MEASUREMENT
Now, the problem is to measure the distance between two probabilistic distributions. There are a number of ways to define the distance between them. Given two distributions P = ( 6 and 2.7) , where the overall distribution of the Income attribute is Q = {3k, 4k, 5k, 6k, 7k, 8k, 9k, 10k, 11k}. The first equivalence class in Table 2 .7 has distribution P 1 = {3k, 4k, 5k} and the second equivalence class has distribution P 2 = {6k, 8k, 11k}. Our intuition is that P 1 results in more information leakage than P 2 , because the values in P 1 are all in the lower end; thus we would like to have D [P 2 , Q] > D [P 2 ; Q]. The distance measures mentioned above would not be able to do so, because from their point of view, values such as 3k and 6k are just different points and have no other semantic meaning. In short, there is a metric space for the attribute values so that a ground distance is defined between any pair of values. Then there are two probability distributions over these values, and the distance between the two probability distributions to be dependent upon the ground distances among these values. This requirement leads to the Earth Mover's distance (EMD). EMD is described and how to use EMD in the closeness measures.
Earth Movers Distance
The EMD is based on the minimal amount of work needed to transform one distribution to another by moving distribution mass between each other. Intuitively, one distribution is seen as a mass of earth spread in the space and the other as a collection of holes in the same space. EMD measures the least amount of work needed to fill the holes with earth. A unit of work corresponds to moving a unit of earth by a unit of ground distance. EMD can be formally defined using the wellstudied transportation problem. Let P = (p 1, p 2, … p m ), Q = (q 1, q 2, … q m ),and d ij be the ground distance between element i of P and element j of Q. We want to find a flow F = [ f ij ], where f ij is the flow of mass from element i of P to element j of Q that minimizes the overall work:
In the next section, formulas are derived for calculating EMD for the special cases that are needed to consider. 
EMD for Numerical Attributes

RESULTS
Here N can take any numeric value and T represents threshold value. For each group having less than N value is compared with all other groups and distance is calculated between them. If closeness is achieved for greater N value and small T value it represents more privacy.
AnonymousData
When the Anonymous Data button is clicked on the output screen it displays all the patients' records which are anonymized and grouped. After entering values for N and T click on NT Closeness button and save button, Then the EMD distance is calculated between the groups present in the anonymous table and the result is displayed as shown in the following figure
CONCLUSION
Initially the patients table having 60 records is created in the database. Then the quasi-identifier values in the table are replaced with the values that are less specific but semantically consistent. The table is anonymized which contains 9 groups i.e.., 27 records (9* 3=27). The proposed algorithm is implemented on the anonymized table to calculate the distance between the groups. A series of values for n ant t are taken to show the capability of the proposed algorithm
SCOPE FOR FUTURE WORK
Multiple sensitive attributes present additional challenges. Suppose if there are two sensitive attributes U and V. One can consider the two attributes separately, i.e., an equivalence class E has (n, t)-closeness if E has (n, t)-closeness with respect to both U and V. Another approach is to consider the joint distribution of the two attributes. To use this approach, one has to choose the ground distance between pairs of sensitive attribute values. A simple formula for calculating EMD may be difficult to derive, and the relationship between (n, t) and the level of privacy become more complicated. 
